In this episode of Barbarian at the Gate, hosts Jeremiah Jenne and David Moser are joined by special guest Karlis Rokpelnis, China country representative for the European Union's Euraxess Research Mobility Initiative. Together, they delve into the evolving landscape of international education in China, discussing the factors influencing the decline in student exchanges and the varying approaches of American and European institutions. Karlis offers his unique perspective on the changes he's observed over the past decade, from a gradual decline in short-term exchanges to a rise in long-term study programs at top universities.
The conversation also explores the differing cultural and political dynamics between the U.S. and Europe when it comes to studying in China, including the impact of xenophobia, political rhetoric, and international relations on academic exchanges. The trio reflects on what motivates students to come to China, how they engage with their studies, and the future of China-related scholarship. With a blend of humor and insight, this episode captures the complexities of navigating education and politics across borders, offering listeners a thoughtful and engaging look into the current state of studying China from abroad.
Transcript:
Jeremiah: Hello and welcome to another edition of Barbarian to the Gate. This is Jeremiah Jenne, broadcasting from over here in Europe, calling back to the old country where I am joined by both David Moser, my illustrious, well-traveled co-host coming in from the Third Ring Road. How are you doing, David?
David: Pretty good. Beautiful weather in Beijing. My wife and I were walking around when a foreign family—husband, wife, and a kid—were walking up to us, obviously wanting to ask directions. I thought probably the kid would ask me, but instead, he asked my wife in fluent, well, very good Mandarin. I'm not sure why—maybe he just wanted to show off. Then we learned that the kid had been studying Mandarin in international schools and was taking them around as a guide. So that was kind of nice. Very encouraging to see kids of that age already up to speed, you know, speaking Mandarin. It's great. It gave me a sense of optimism for the future.
Jeremiah: A sense of optimism and a sense of purpose—the idea that our life and careers haven't been utterly wasted. And there we go. I might edit that part out. And with us as well, also based in Beijing but currently on a southern tour to the city of Guangzhou, Karlis Rokpelnis, originally from Latvia. Karlis first started studying Chinese while he was doing an undergraduate degree in the U.S. He went to China as an exchange student for a program called IES Abroad for the first time in 2006, earned a doctoral degree in ethnoecology from Minzu University of China, and taught and managed American study abroad programs in China and the rest of Asia for over a decade. Early this spring, however, Karlis became the China country representative for the European Union's—yes, folks, this is how it's pronounced—Euraxess Research Mobility Initiative. Welcome to the pod, Karlis.
Karlis: Good evening.
We've been talking on the podcast this summer about the future, really, of studying in China—what things look like on the ground for those who are either working, researching, or learning the language. Karlis, you've been working in the study abroad field and international education for over a decade. You were a foreign exchange student yourself. Tell us, from your perspective, what do you see that's changed, or what do you see happening on the ground that could affect the next generation of China scholars?
Karlis: Well, I showed up in Beijing as an exchange student. Jeremiah, you didn't teach me when I was a student, but you came into the study abroad program where I was studying just a few years later and sort of, I guess, as the generation before me working in study abroad. Then David is probably the generation before you. I think David probably started off seeing a gradual uptick. You were there when things were going the wildest. And then I have had the pleasure of watching things peter out and dwindle until, of course, we had COVID, where everything was on complete hold.
I actually had a very interesting experience at that time, working with Chinese students of American universities who were stuck in China. Therefore, their colleges decided they needed to have a little bit of America within China, and I worked with a group of colleagues setting up a college—or not a college, but a program of studying in an American university—a little America within the city of Shanghai. But with that little blip, when I at some point had more than a thousand students under my tutelage, other than that, the last decade has been a very steady decline in the number of students coming for, you know, short-term exchange or something like a year or less.
There have been some changes in, you know, people coming for longer studies. We've seen the creation of a few kind of prominent "study in China" programs in universities in Beijing, and we've seen quite a few graduate or master's and Ph.D. students. And those numbers, I think, are probably going up, especially in the top universities in Beijing. But yet, the exchange field has really hit a major storm and now is completely on the rocks.
David: Jeremiah and I tend to be very America-centric, being Yankees, and I know you probably can't speak for all of Europe, but I'm wondering if you have some impressions about the differences and perhaps the reasons why student numbers have been falling all across Europe. Are there some differences in the reason for that? Have some countries kept abreast of this matter while others have gotten worse? I'd just like to know if you have an overall portrait of other countries besides the United States in the sense of this deteriorating student participation in China.
Karlis: Overall, I think that the trend of Europeans studying in China and also studying about China is probably very similar to that of the United States—a peak that coincided roughly around the 2008 Olympics in Beijing. But I think that the shape of the curve is much more spread out. The numbers were higher earlier on, with exchanges happening across a variety of institutions and universities in Europe.
First of all, you have the difference between East and West, of course, where exchanges between Eastern Europe and China started much earlier. Essentially, you had economic-driven changes that took place in the 1990s and later. You definitely had a quicker start, with people coming in to study language but also tagging along with European companies entering China. And then, yes, there was the "coming-out party" that Beijing threw for the world in 2008. I think that for the European student presence in China, perhaps the peak lasted a little longer, and then the reduction that occurred right before COVID was not quite as steep, partly because many institutions had direct exchanges with China.
The U.S. education institutions either come in with a really well-resourced study program, with a whole bunch of very well-resourced American university offices in Beijing that run their own programs, or they come in with third-party study abroad providers that all of us have worked with. The Europeans, for the most part, have university-to-university exchanges. Oftentimes, the universities—well, let's be honest—don't really pamper the students back home, and they don't do that when they come to Beijing either. The programs tend to be much smaller, and usually, the students are more involved and more integrated with the local university students. Even if they are within the university's foreign student departments, they're still much less in a cocoon, isolated in their own little community. So, once things started petering out, these separate, small-sized university connections took a little longer to diminish. In the end, again, the pattern is the same: less interest in studying Chinese, less interest in coming to China.
Jeremiah: Jumping on David's question too, one of the headwinds, if you will, to getting students to China from the United States has been a rise in xenophobia or a change in feelings in America towards China. There's a lot of political rhetoric, particularly on the right but not a small amount from the left as well, that tends to be very critical of China—sometimes for valid reasons, sometimes just for sport, and sometimes for no reason at all. But, as you said, in Europe, there's a slightly different system for students going abroad. And to echo David's caution that we're not asking you to speak for an entire continent, do you see any similar issues in Europe, or are there different reasons why we've seen a trailing off of these kinds of exchange programs for European students going to China?
Karlis: Well, again, the general trajectory is very similar. The European approach to China, politically speaking, has been quite different in words compared to the U.S., but there is still a strong concern about overall changes in China at a political level. And this does reflect a sort of bottom-up view in Europe that there are things to be worried about in China, right? At the same time, I think that, first of all, the rhetoric is less intense; it's more measured. And, of course, Europe is not a single country. So, while many people want to speak on behalf of Europe, there's also very clearly competition over who gets to talk on behalf of Europe. And there are more people you can "trade horses" with from the Chinese side. So overall, you don't get the same kind of harsh rhetoric about China.
Then, with regards to the student response to these changes in China and to rhetoric about China, my sense is that there is less fear but also a lack of interest. And that’s what we really need to recognize—that as much as there is fear and concern, the other side of the same issue is just a reduction in interest. We have to keep in mind that in the last decade, if you take Asia as a region for exchange and study, the rest of Asia has been going up. It's China that's going down. And that concern exists in America, but it's very much the same situation in Europe. I think the huge similarity here is this reduction in interest.
David: You mentioned the difference in the types of students who come from Europe compared to those who might come from the United States. We've characterized American students coming to China as part of a "China studies" format, which is often based on topics related to China and largely rooted in the humanities—not a lot of heavy-duty history and so forth. Whereas Europe tends to approach it under the rubric of "sinology," a more serious academic kind of flavor. It was interesting to me that you said most of the European exchange programs are university-to-university, whereas the programs that Jeremiah and I both worked for—which did involve universities, by the way—were through a third-party intermediary. That seems to suggest two very different kinds of students. Is there any phenomenon to be looked at there? Do European students come to China in a very different way, making their investment less fleeting and more permanent, more career-based, and academic? How would you characterize the difference if there is one?
Karlis: Well, there is a difference in how the education systems are set up, and essentially how your investment in your education is driven by how much you pay for it. I think that's a big difference in just how you think about your education—whether you're paying whatever it is these days in the States for an undergraduate degree, which is like, what, $80,000 a year?—or if you go to a free university somewhere in Germany.
I think that all three of us are probably a little biased because we've spent our time in the sort of "university belt" of Beijing, and that is where the hardcore European sinologists show up. So you find the occasional German student who is 21 and reads classical Chinese. I think if you went to Shanghai or even here in Guangzhou, you would find that a lot of European students are here for a much different set of reasons. There are many business exchange programs going into various parts of China. There's a lot of curriculum designed to train students to become, let's say, workers—auto workers, for example. The German training system includes many exchanges to the places where these cars are made, and there are still many German cars being made in China, at least for now. There definitely has been an educational system and system of exchanges built around that.
So, whether the Europeans who come to China are more prepared for what they will learn here—whether it's sinology or car making—I don't know. I think you'll still find the same level of exploration that you see in the American China studies model, where you come in with either a fair amount of preparation or perhaps very little China background, and then you do a semester of China exploration. Or you might come from a technical school anywhere in Europe or somewhere else. I'm not sure you'll find much difference in where their careers ultimately take them.
Jeremiah: One of the issues we've talked about in this podcast—and one that people have been writing about quite a bit this summer and fall—involves who criticizes China, who gets to criticize China, and how we as non-Chinese should approach China in all of its glorious messiness and complexity. We've seen books this summer published by people like Peter Hessler. Jeff Wasserstrom, a professor of history at the University of California, Irvine, and a well-known public intellectual who writes about China, just wrote an excellent essay about Tim Walz and China and the question of whether people should go to China. He reflects in this article about how, as an American academic, he has chosen not to go to China, at least at this stage in his career, because of issues he has with the way China is going today. I am very curious about the perspective coming out of Europe. Is there a difference? We've talked about how there's a wide range of views, but is there a difference in how the EU might approach China on specific issues?
Here's the issue I'm thinking of: In the U.S., there's been a lot of criticism of China and China's support—tacit or otherwise—for Russia during the war in Ukraine. But I wonder if this looks very different from a European perspective. In the U.S., I sometimes think it's kind of a spectator sport. We want the guy we don't like to lose. Or if you're Donald Trump, you want the guy who has pictures of you in a hotel room to win—whatever that may be. But in Europe, this is a much more visceral thing, particularly if you're coming from a region of Europe like the Baltic States, which have their own history with Russia.
Karlis: Let me think about this. The question you're asking is: Are Europeans concerned about whether to go or not to go? That question?
Jeremiah: Yeah. Or I should say, are they concerned about whether to go or not to go, and if they choose not to go, is it coming from the same place that we're seeing a lot of American academics choosing not to go?
Karlis: The last five years have been very challenging in terms of where Europe and China find themselves—a sort of game of ping-pong, given what happened with COVID and then, right after, the crisis that exploded with the second, active phase of the war in Ukraine. The European political response, of course, has been very loud in support of Ukraine. And yet, when it comes to exchanges with China, those have not stopped or been curtailed. If you have been interacting with China, Europeans have been taking any opportunity that comes up to engage and maintain dialogue despite a very clear concern that China's support for Russia is substantial.
At a more private level, I'm not seeing—or perhaps I'm not noticing—such strong back-and-forth on whether anyone on an individual level should choose to come or not to come, especially those who have the opportunity to choose. There are some people who can't come, right? But for those who have to make this decision, I haven't noticed an ongoing debate. My sense is that people are maintaining engagement where it is needed and where it's possible. But as I said earlier about education, the interest and level of general interest are definitely down. So I think that those who do not have the need to make the choice simply don't bother thinking about it.
Interestingly, China has made significant efforts to attract tourists from Europe. Most of the countries that now have new visa-free, unilateral access to China are European countries. Some of the more recent announcements were just reinstating previously existing arrangements, but the new ones are mostly from Europe. We're seeing an increase in people showing up in China for those 15 days, but my impression is that it's still not close to what you would have seen if this had happened five years ago. The interest has been reduced significantly.
David: As an American involved in China, I'm aware that when I'm here with people from different nationalities, there's something unique about the U.S.-China relationship. It makes us feel a sense of urgency that if we don't get this right, it may be more consequential than the relationship China has with some other country, especially one that's not a superpower.
That's the sort of rhetoric we hear. For instance, we had a meeting, I guess it was two summers ago, at an expat's residence where the U.S. Ambassador, Nicholas Burns, was talking to some expats. This was during the "balloon incident"—remember the balloon that flew over North America? Ambassador Burns was saying how lucky we were to have the sage, wise advice of an Orville Schell and a Susan Shirk during that diplomatic crisis. I raised my hand and said, "That's wonderful, but where are the new Susan Shirks and Orville Schells going to come from?" Because we had already missed five years of a burgeoning generation of young scholars who could become the next Susan Shirk or Orville Schell.
I'm wondering if it's different in Europe because I don't imagine—except maybe for certain countries like Germany—there's the same sense of urgency. Is there a different sense in Europe about the importance of getting the China relationship correct? It doesn't seem to carry the same geopolitical burden or sense of urgency. And that might make a difference in the reasons people go to China or the reasons Europeans invest in China, maybe for different reasons than Americans, who might feel a sort of historical urgency or even a manifest destiny.
Karlis: The manifest destiny of America is sorting out China. Every single undergraduate is told during their first week in Beijing that, depending on the decade, something is really important and they're here for a very important reason. I think that rhetoric is definitely different. Today, China is a very significant trade partner for many countries in the EU—it's the biggest trade partner outside of fellow EU countries. There are so many ways the Chinese economy, or Chinese policy, affects people. So there's definitely a shared sense that this relationship is important. But I don't think it carries the same burden in the same sense. Although, there are probably Germans coming here trying to learn about cars so that they can hope to have a next generation of cars back home that will be competitive. That kind of burden is possible, and people come to make the best of the bilateral relationship with China.
Then, of course, the EU is an entity that, if you look at it as one big body, it's a really different context. If you're 20, you don't really get a sense of responsibility for the EU-China relationship the way you might if you go to an elite school in the U.S.
Jeremiah: I wonder if part of that is a leftover from the missionary days, this idea that the U.S. has this responsibility and special relationship with China, and that they're going to lead China into the future. And, of course, that particular construction has proven elusive, comical even, generation after generation—from missionaries to democracy activists to human rights campaigners. I mean, don't get me wrong; there's nothing wrong with human rights and democracy, but I think it's important to recognize that China will change on China's terms. The idea that we Americans who show up are going to somehow be an integral part of that change is a bit of a manifest destiny or hubris.
Karlis: But then again, Sun Yat-sen spent a good amount of time, not just in Japan but also in Hawaii. The connections between the U.S. and China are very, very significant. So it's good that people take them seriously.
David: I have a quick question. Karlis, could you briefly tell us what motivated you to get involved in China? Can you tell us in a few words?
Karlis: I started studying Chinese because, well, I had to take a language. I went to a liberal arts college and had to take a language, and the options were German, Spanish, French. I hadn't studied those before, and I was like, "Not going to do German in rural America." Then the other options were Chinese or Japanese. So I decided to try Chinese just to fulfill the language requirement. Then I went to China for the first time and loved it. And then I went back again and again and again. So I started out with a sort of linguistic adventure, and then I learned a lot of things through it and enjoyed that learning process.
Jeremiah: Well, I think it's been great too, Karlis, the way you've been able to take—even if it was "it's not going to be German, it must be Chinese"—and turn it into a career and the way you've shared that with so many students over the years.
Before we go, I do have one of my favorite Karlis stories, among a few of them. Karlis and I worked together at a study abroad program and shared many adventures, but one of them was taking a group of students on a trip to what's today Dongbei, the Northeast, and to the border of Russia, where there's a Chinese version of Tijuana where Mongolia, Russia, and China come together—a place called Manzhouli. Karlis was working for our program at the time and came along with the students, in large part because Karlis speaks Russian, which is a very useful language in that area.
But many people who know Karlis will also know he's a vegetarian. There was a barbecue being held on the steppe in Inner Mongolia, where the idea was that you would get a sheep, and to execute the sheep, you "unplug" it. I'm not going to go too much into how this works, but essentially, an incision is made, you unplug the carotid artery, and the sheep falls over—it's supposed to be relatively humane. In this particular instance, however, in front of about 20 assembled American undergraduates, our Mongolian hosts missed their mark. It became less an issue of unplugging the sheep and more of trying to decapitate it with a large knife. Karlis, who is committed not only to China education but also to environmental activism and vegetarianism, was heard walking up and down the assembled students saying, "Any converts? Any converts? Any converts?"
Karlis, thank you so much for joining us on the podcast today. We hope to get you back, and good luck with the new position at Euraxess.
Karlis: The pleasure is all mine. We should go out to Mongolia again soon.
Jeremiah: Actually, the one country in Asia I haven't been to is Outer Mongolia. I somehow missed that window. I know everything about Outer Mongolia says I would like it there. It was just one of those things where I was never able to put together the trip and the plan to get to Outer Mongolia. I've been to Inner Mongolia many times, but not Outer Mongolia. So maybe that's a good place to meet, because then I don't need a Chinese visa.
Karlis: That's good. Outer Mongolia is good. Well, I mean, you know, I have low standards in terms of... no, no. I have high standards for many things; cultural experiences are one of them. They actually have a really good fast-food chain called Modern Nomads in Ulaanbaatar. They do many good things, including vegetarian food, but the rest is lamb. You should go.
Jeremiah: That's important because when most people think of Mongolian cuisine, finding vegetarian versions is not always easy.
Karlis: Actually, probably the best Italian vegan restaurant I've been to was in Ulaanbaatar, of all places.
Jeremiah: Well, check that out. If you're ever in the Ulaanbaatar region and feeling the need for some vegetarian Italian food, recommendations are available.
David, Thank you again for calling in at night.
David: My pleasure.
Jeremiah: And good luck this next semester too. Have you started yet? I think I asked you that last time.
David: Yeah, already started. And the students have discovered I've been on TV a few times, so I've actually signed a few autographs in class. They don't know why, but they think anybody who's done anything but teach is probably worthy of admiration, I guess.
Karlis: Do people in the current student generation even watch TV? I mean, do they know what a TV is? Does it matter?
David: No, no, no. They just search it on the internet. They don't watch TV. And I think they're more interested in the fact that, like, you play music. They don't care what kind of music you play. You just play music; that gives you points. Keep in mind, the teachers there are... well, I don't want to say anything bad about the teachers, but they're not exactly the most socially uninhibited and outrageous. They're pretty staid, proper conservative people who just teach the class. I tend to get way off base and go off on tangents, and they like that.
Jeremiah: Well, give us an update after you have your first faculty party and banquet and just see how staid and calm they are behind closed doors. My experience working at Chinese universities is that the most quiet, serious, and by-the-book academics were usually the first to take their shirts off in the karaoke room.
Thank you all for listening. Join us again for another edition of Barbarian at the Gate. You can find us on all those platforms that host podcasts.
I think at this point, we'll just cue the drums.